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MAPPING A WAY THROUGH DISASTER AND
EMERGENCY ISSUES INVOLVING INDIAN
COUNTRY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL
PREPAREDNESS
By Brian Candelaria

The teepee is much better to live in;
always clean, warm in winter, cool in summer; easy
to move.
The white man builds his big house, cost much
money, like big cage, shut out sun, can never move;
always sick. Indians and animals know better how
to live than white man; nobody can be in good
health if he does not have all the time fresh air,
sunshine, and good water.
--Chief Flying Hawk1

J.D., Oklahoma City University School of Law (2019); M.L.S., University of
Oklahoma School of Law (2016). While I am not of American Indian
Indigenous ancestry, I believe that the fight to maintain the sovereignty of
American Indian Nations carries with it some universal truths. These truths are
related to identity, spirituality, and sense of community. This article represents
my humble attempt to communicate and better understand some of the lessons I
have learned. Moreover, I pledge to devote my professional career to
collaborating with fellow allies of all backgrounds to achieve cultural
mindfulness through the classroom and the courtroom. I want to express my
sincere gratitude to the editors of the AILJ for their suggestions in helping me
better communicate my message. Any flaws or confusion rest solely upon me, as
the author of this article. Special thanks go to my colleagues at Oklahoma Indian
Legal Services, and the many others who have academically and professionally
mentored me over the years. However, I save my deepest gratefulness,
affection, and appreciation for my family and friends, past and present and
future. In particular, I wish to thank: my amazing wife, Kathryn Candelaria; my
mother Gloria Candelaria, my sister Tara Candelaria, my niece Ayla Driskell,
my brothers-in-law, and the entire Gurule and James families. Their shared
patience and support made my academic career, and thus this article, possible.
1 Chief Flying Hawk, as quoted in M.I. MCCREIGHT, FIREWATER AND FORKED
TONGUES: A SIOUX CHIEF INTERPRETS U.S. HISTORY 61 (Pasadena, California:
T ail End P bli hing Co., Inc., 1947).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In oda
mode n o ld and i h he e of mode n
technology, people use electronic devices in a variety of ways. For
example, the devices afford users with an opportunity to visualize
various surroundings that to which they may not otherwise have
access. While one of he e i al eali de ice i no a ailable
to the author for purposes of this paper, we can use an older
sometimes under- ili ed fo m of i al eali
the imagination.
There are a variety of mental images that can be used to guide the
reader through on the path of gaining knowledge and better
understanding. Imagine for a moment the following scenarios:
It is a quiet spring morning in March. You are
asleep in your modest little home outside of
Oso, Washington, when you feel the ground
shake. You briefly think it is an earthquake
until you hear the sounds of buildings around
you being crushed and destroyed. You look
out of your bedroom window and see a wall of
mud tearing through the valley. Pushing and
dragging houses and vehicles in its wake.
It is a stormy spring afternoon in southern
California. You have been told for a week that
a severe winter storm may be coming and with
it a large amount of snow. The day is here and
so are the storms. The storm comes barreling
through your town. As you wait in your home
for the storm to pass, you wonder what will
happen when the snow melts and its effect on
the nearby Lake Henshaw reservoir. In a state
of disbelief, you wait for the snow to stop.
After a particularly devastating summer of
wildfires and drought in north-central New
Mexico. It is now raining. It has been raining
constantly for days. You look out the window
of your home, which your family has owned
for generations, and see the river outside. The
river ordinarily would be a quarter mile from
the house but now it is only yards away. You
3

sigh and gather more of your belongings to
load in your truck while your family members
unload more sandbags to hold back the river.
It is a gorgeous summer day in August. You
are on a bank of the San Juan River. You are
about to step into the river, hand-in-hand with
your grandson, when you notice the water is
slowly turning a bright orange color that you
have never before seen in the river. Perplexed
and a bit scared you decide that you and your
grandson should not go into the river today.
Your grandson turns to you and asks what
happened. You tell him you do not know as
you both stare at the river.
Finally, you are on your North Dakota farm
tending your cattle when you notice that one
or two members of the herd are acting out of
the ordinary. You approach the cows and
begin thinking about separating them from the
others so that whatever little bug they have
does not spread. A couple days later your
whole herd is wiped out. It is then you hear
from your neighbors that it may be anthrax.
With those images in mind let us now add to each scenario
the experiencing these events as a Native American tribe member.
To whom would you turn prior to each disaster or emergency? To
whom do you turn as the event is occurring? To whom do you turn
after the event? As the results of this research paper demonstrate,
these are not easy questions to answer. Difficulties range from the
intricacies of federal Indian law, lack of coordination between
federal, state and tribal agencies, and lack of shared vision for
preparedness and prevention. This paper will explore why complex
jurisdictional issues in Indian Country make disasters and
emergencies, whether they be natural or human-made, extremely
difficult for tribal authorities to address.
To fully illustrate the difficulties facing members of
federally recognized American Indian Nations and Tribes in these
situations, this paper is divided into multiple sections to guide the
reader through the difficult jurisdictional terrain. Part I of this paper
4

will help get the reader familiar with the unique legal relationship
American Indian Nations have with state and federal governments.
This paper will first take a detailed, exhaustive look at the evolution
of federal policie and applicable legal doc ine . I i he a ho
objective to assist the reader in better understanding the
complexities regarding the current status of jurisdictional issues
involving state, federal, and tribal governments. Part II will explore
the disaster and emergency assistance program processes. This
cursory legal background, then, will give the reader a helpful map
with which the author will discuss past disasters in Indian Country
in Part III. In Part III of the paper, the author will review examples
of man-made, as well as natural disasters that have plagued
American Indian Nations over the course of recent years. In Part IV,
this paper will address the legal morass of future tensions and
conflicts towards various paths of possible solutions as American
Indian Nations prepare their citizens to face future disasters and
emergencies. The paper will then conclude with a final look at what
the author has learned over the course of the research and important
final takeaways the reader should bear in mind regarding this
subject.
II.

BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

To understand the evolution of Federal Indian Policy it is
important to establish a groundwork for the discussion to follow. In
particular, this overview will provide the context with which we will
survey the legal jurisdictional issues involved in disaster and
emergency issues in Indian Country. Historically, the Supreme
Court has attempted to create a set of doctrines for the peaceful coexistence of the federal, state, and tribal governments. The success
of such doctrines can be decided and debated at length, but some
effects are indisputable and informative.
A. What is Indian Country?
Before we embark upon the history and background of
Federal Indian Law, we must first agree upon an important
definition and concept that will be used and understood throughout
o jo ne . The concep i ha of Indian Co n . While a
5

helpful way to descriptively unite the American Indian Nations and
Tribes from through-out the United States, the term also serves as a
helpf l in od c ion in he ecogni ion p oce ha encap la e
the rest of our educational voyage.
Pe he Uni ed S a e Code, [e] cep a o he i e p o ided
in ec ion 1154 and 1156 Indian Co n
efe o:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United State
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and including rights-of-way running through
the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the
limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same. 2
By exploring the history of Federal Indian policy, we can add legal
context to what it means to live in and govern Indian Country.
B. Some History of Federal Indian Policy
A person need not be a student of federal Indian policy to
realize that imbalances litter the history of Federal-Indian
interactions. However, these inequities merely expose the
complexities faced by federal and Native governments alike. The
initial interactions between European settlers and Native American
Tribes represented tentative attempts to establish boundaries based
upon personal interactions. Depending upon the country of origin,
colonists treated Native American Tribes with varying degrees of
respect and esteem. 3 As interactions between settlers and Native
American Tribes increased, so did the need for more formalized
dialogue that would take the form of treaty negotiations. The use of
treaty formation served as an important initial establishment of
expectations regarding property rights and sovereignty concerns,
18 U.S.C. § 1151.
COHEN S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §1.02[1] (hereinafter COHEN
HANDBOOK).
2
3
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while also avoiding potential future conflicts. 4 Treaties made during
Colonial, and early Post-Constitutional Eras provide a backdrop for
the interpretative tools and doctrine that courts would later use to
sharpen the perimeters to decide future legal disputes.
It would not be until after the ratification of the United States
Constitution that a more cohesive strategy would be developed. The
United States Congress passed what would be the framework of how
the country would interact with the Tribal Nations by passing the
Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790. However, these initial pieces of
legislation were designed to prevent unlicensed, unauthorized
purchases of Indian land, whether by individuals or by states. The
resulting collision of federal versus state power necessitated the
emergence of a body that could begin to address some of the initial
points of conflict that would inevitably involve Native American
Nations on issues of lands rights, access to resources, and to trade.5
The United States Supreme Court (hereafter Supreme Court) would
be that body. The Supreme Court played a vital role in future Federal
Indian policy interpretation and formation, as the federal judiciary
laid m ch of he g o nd o k fo he ubsequent development of
Indian la and polic in he e a ea . 6
C.

Cherokee Cases and Doctrine Formation

This formative impact began especially true with the early
Supreme Court rulings of J h
.M I
h, 21 U.S. 543 (1823)7,
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)8, and Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832)9 (hereinafter referred to as the
Cherokee Ca e ). The landmark doctrines created by the
Cherokee cases centered upon the protection of the Indian Nations
from the state governments by the young, fledgling federal
government. In other words, the Cherokee Ca e ep e en ed he
framework in which the relationship between the Native American
Id.
Lind a G. Robe on, John on . M In o h in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, as cited in DENNIS W. ARROW,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: A PRACTICE-ORIENTED CASEBOOK, p. 24 (Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma: Dennis W. Arrow, 2016).
6 Id.
7 Johnson . M In o h, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
8 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
9 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
4
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and he E opean Se le (o In ade , depending pon one
perspective) would be established and ultimately settled. It is this
relationship, this framework, this division of duty and responsibility,
hich p e ail o hi da in Ame ican Indian polic . 10
The legal foundations established by the Cherokee Cases
emmed f om Chief J ice Ma hall in od c ion of a io
innovative doctrines. The resulting discovery doctrine, the domestic
dependent nation doctrine, and the trust doctrine all represented
Ma hall a emp o add e ome of he ini ial i e ega ding he
sovereignty of Indian nations. For example, in J h
.M I
h,
Ma hall o gh o add e
he fundamental land question: what
real property rights did Europeans acquire, and indigenous people
lo e, b i e of he E opean di co e
of Ame ica? 11 To do
this, he created the discovery doctrine, which resulted in the Native
American peoples being effec i el con e ed in o enan on hei
land and denied he igh o ell hei lea e on he open ma ke ,
hile he Uni ed S a e became hei landlo d. 12 Next, Chief Justice
Ma hall opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia introduced the
denominated domestic dependent doctrine and the guardian-ward
relationship doctrine.13 The result of these doctrines was that the
federal government would be obligated to assume trust duties that
have proven to be relevant to the subsequent federal-tribal
interac ion . Finall , he S p eme Co
Worcester v. Georgia
opinion established that:
Indian nations had always been considered as
distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial, with the single exception of that
imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them
from intercourse with any other European potentate
than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular
Rennard Strickland, The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in INDIAN LAW
STORIES, 62 (Carole Goldberg, ed., New York, NY: Foundation Press, 2011).
11 Lindsay G. Robertson, The Judicial Conquest of Native America: The Story of
J h
.MI
h, in INDIAN LAW STORIES, 29-30 (Carole Goldberg, ed., New
York, NY: Foundation Press, 2011).
12 Id. at 30.
13 DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND:
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW (Norman, OK.: University
of Oklahoma Press, 2001).
10
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region claimed: and this was a restriction which those
European potentates imposed on themselves, as on
the Indians. . . . . The Cherokee nation, then, is a
distinct community occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws
of Georgia can have no force and which the citizens
of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent
of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole
intercourse between the United States and this
nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the
government of the United States.14
Thus, the federal judiciary had now recognized that: (1) American
Indian Nations possessed only those property rights, those
abo iginal p ope
i le , a
ecogni ed b
he fede al
go e nmen a he di co e ing na ion (a pe Johnson v.
MI
h); (2) the relationship between recognized American Indian
Nations, as denominated domestic dependent nations, and the
Fede al Go e nmen
a ha of g a dian- a d
i h he
accompanying trust obligations; (as per Cherokee Nation); and (3)
only the federal government and not state governments would
con ol he e m of ade and in e co e i h Ame ican Indian
Nations (as per Worcester). These three important foundational
concepts allowed the Supreme Court to acknowledge the basic, but
limited, sovereignty of American Indian nations.
D. The Two Resulting Limitations from the Cherokee Cases
The first limitation derived from the Cherokee Cases was
that American Indian Nations could not enter into treaty
negotiations with competing foreign nations. Established in
Johnson, this limitation was designed to provide the United States
with some peace of mind. In particular, government officials of the
United States, including those on the Supreme Court, worried that
American Indian Nations would be tempted to create alliances and,
maybe more importantly, create constructive economic agreement
with countries like Great Britain and France. It was feared that if this
was allowed to happen, the United States would be caught in never
14

Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559, 561 (1832).
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ending military and/or economic warfare that could ultimately lead
to the possible destruction of the young and fragile nation. 15
The second limitation on tribal sovereignty resulting from
the Cherokee Ca e
a ha Ame ican Indian na ion
ee
stripped of their right to freely convey their land to anyone other
han he U.S. fede al go e nmen . 16 This limitation was also
designed with United States economic security in mind. In essence,
Indian i le a echnicall alienable, b onl o he go e nmen ,
hich alone co ld e ing i h Indian i le. 17 This limitation was
f he amplified b Chief J ice Ma hall de c ip ion of
American Indian proprietary interest as occ panc . B de c ibing
the American Indian Nation property interests in terms of
occ panc , Ma hall S p eme Co opinion opened he a
for subsequent courts to interpret the doctrines as providing a
fo nda ion b
hich Ame ican Indian Na ion
igh of f ee
alienation was inherently lost to the overriding sovereignty of the
Uni ed S a e . 18
Despite an apparent attempt to create an approach that
balanced some recognition of American Indian Nation territorial
integrity, the Court also recognized ha he go e nmen
igh of
preemption was necessary to prevent the Indians from selling their
land to citizens of hostile countries, a considerable concern along
he No h Ame ican f on ie . 19 In the end, the Cherokee Cases
established two important limits to the exercise of sovereignty by
American Indian Nations: (1) restricting and prohibiting the ability
of American Indian Nations to enter into treaties with competing
foreign nations, and (2) limiting the ability of American Indian
Nations to freely convey their land to anyone other than the U.S.
federal government. By doing so, the Cherokee Cases created a
foundation of federal case law that future Courts would use to
address American Indian issues by either advancing or hindering
American Indian Nation sovereignty.

See generally Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine:
Aboriginal Title, Tribal Sovereignty, and their Significance to Treaty-Making
and Modern Natural Resources Policy in Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713,
753, 740 (2004).
16Andrew K. Fletcher, Suffocating Sovereignty: Implicit Divestiture and the
Violation of First Principles, 5 Dartmouth L.J. 31, 48, at 40 (2007).
17 Blumm, supra note 16, at 739.
18 Id. at 740.
19 Id.
15
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E.

Resulting Criminal and Civil Jurisdictional Issues

As the years passed and some formative legal doctrines had
been established, the American Indian Nations recognized that when
issues or conflicts warranted it, they could go the federal court
system to seek relief. Soon, jurisdictional categories were
acknowledged in terms of criminal jurisdiction and civil
jurisdiction. It also soon became evident that two important factors
would determine the judicial approach at curing the conflicts
Indian a
of he land in ol ed and he Indian a
of he
parties involved. Whether the matter entailed a criminal
jurisdictional issue or a civil jurisdictional issue, the Supreme Court
began to diversify legal doctrines established by the Cherokee
Cases. One of the first cases that approached criminal cases using
this bifurcated approach was United States v. McBratney20 and was
later followed by Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 21 and United
States v. Wheeler.22 The subsequent case of Montana built upon the
Oliphant approach, leading to a series of civil cases, both regulatory
and adjudicatory in nature, that would seriously hobble the
sovereignty of American Indian Nations.
1. Split-Status Approach for Criminal Cases
McBratney to Oliphant and Wheeler

From

Even prior to the Cherokee cases, the Indian status of the
perpetrator of a crime and the Indian status of the land involved were
important factors in determining the jurisdictional venue within
which the case would be heard. The United States Congress first
codified this approach in 1790 with its passage of Indian Country
Crimes Act.23 This piece of legislation allowed for the federal
prosecution of non-Indian perpetrators that committed crimes in
Indian Country. It was designed as a means of protecting non-Indian
defendants from the perceived inequality they would face if tried in
a tribal court. The Indian Country Crimes Act was later amended in
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
22 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
23 See 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
20
21
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1817 to allow for the federal prosecution of crimes involving nonIndian victims but perpetrated by Indian defendants. It was designed
as a means of protecting non-Indian victims from a perceived
indifference by tribal courts. This was the status of criminal
jurisdiction prior to the Cherokee cases, which did not outwardly
alter this regime. Thus, following the Worcester case, American
Indian Nations retained some important jurisdictional powers in the
sphere of criminal law and civil law within its borders, especially
over Indian tribe members. This would begin to change with
McBratney.
In McBratney, the defendant was accused and later
convicted in a federal court of killing a man on the Ute reservation
in pre-statehood Colorado.24 Both the defendant and the victim
shared non-Indian status. The land upon which the murder occurred
was considered Indian Country. As per the rationale of the
Worcester case, the Supreme Court should have found that the
federal court was indeed the correct venue to try the accused given
his non-Indian status. However, the Court found that because of a
treaty with the Ute Tribe and terms of the enabling statute for the
state of Colorado, the federal government lacked criminal
jurisdiction over the crime. The result was that the newly formed
State of Colorado possessed sole criminal jurisdiction of crimes
committed by a non-Indian against a non-Indian victim on a theory
that activities not involving Indians did not impact the concerns or
interests of the Indian tribes. 25
While seen for many years as a unique and narrow exception
based on treaty language, the McBratney opinion nevertheless
garnered its fair share of critici m. J di h Ro e opined ha [ ]he
absurdity of that theory should be obvious; no other government is
required to ignore crimes committed within its boundaries between
non-ci i en . 26 This limited exception was later built upon by the
opinion in Draper v. United States. 27 As in McBratney, the Draper
Court held that Congressional authority would be crucial to a new
ae
ela ion hip i h Indian ibe
i hin i bo de . In
particular, the Draper Co
e abli hed ha if a ne
ae
McBratney,104 U.S. at 621.
See Judith V. Royster, Oliphant and Its Discontents: An Essay Introducing
The Case For Reargument Before The American Indian Nations Supreme Court,
13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 59, 62 (2003).
26 Id.
27 Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
24
25

12

enabling ac con ained no e cl ion of j i dic ion a o c ime
committed on an Indian reservation by others than Indians, or
against Indians, the state courts were vested with jurisdiction to try
and p ni h ch c ime . 28
Another series of criminal cases which involved the splitstatus approach were Ex parte Crow Dog29 and United States v.
Kagama.30 Decided within a four-year period between McBratney
and Draper, these two cases added to the structural importance of
using the split-status approach for assessing criminal jurisdiction.
Ex parte Crow Dog involved the murder of an Indian chief named
Spotted Tail by a fellow member of the Lakota tribe, Crow Dog.
Crow Dog was tried and convicted in the manner dictated by Lakota
customs and tradition. However, angered at the perceived leniency
of C o Dog p ni hmen ( e i ion pa men of $600.00, eigh
ho e , and one blanke o he ic im famil ), a fede al Indian
agent had Crow Dog arrested to be tried again in Nebraska State
Court. Crow Dog was charged, indicted, convicted, and sentenced
to death by hanging. Crow Dog appealed his case to the Supreme
Court. The Court held that the federal government lacked criminal
jurisdiction because both the victim and the defendant were Indian
ibe membe and he c ime occ ed in Indian Co n . I i a
ca e he e a ho i and po e hich eek o impo e pon hem
he e ain of an e e nal and nkno n code,
hich judges
hem b a anda d made b o he , and no fo hem, make no
allo ance fo hei inabili
o nde and i .... 31 The Supreme
Court found for Crow Dog and set him free.
Following the case, an outraged populace pushed Congress
to pass the Major Crimes Act of 1885.32 The Act placed seven major
crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court system,
no matter the Indian status of the perpetrator, if the crime was
committed in Indian Country. 33 The crimes were: murder,
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and
larceny.34 All other crimes could either be handled in Tribal court or
Id. at 242.
Ex Parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (historically cited as Ex Parte Crow Dog), 109 U.S.
556 (1883).
30 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
31 Id. at 406.
32 Codified at 18 U.S.C. §1152-1153.
33 Id.
34 Id.
28
29
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in state court depending upon the jurisdiction status of the land upon
which the crime was committed. Soon, the Major Crimes Act
became a tool for the federal government to successfully assert
jurisdiction following the Kagama case. The Supreme Court
concluded in the Kagama case that the Major Crimes Act was
constitutional despite not involving issues of interstate commerce.
Instead the Court harkened back to the Cherokee cases and noted
that as part of its dependent domestic nation status, American Indian
Nations had to be protected by federal government in the form of
Congressional plenary power. 35
The power of the general government over these
remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and
diminished in numbers, is necessary to their
protection, as well as to the safety of those among
whom they dwell. It must exist in that government,
because it never has existed anywhere else; because
the theater of its exercise is within the geographical
limits of the United States; because it has never been
denied; and because it alone can enforce its laws on
all the tribes.36
The result was a case that planted the seed for future limitations of
Tribal Self-Governance.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court had only splinted a power
that Congress already possessed, pursuant to the Cherokee cases.
However, the Court had nevertheless created an environment where
he di co e
of f
e limi a ion co ld be fo nd and c l ed.
Continuing with the field of criminal law, the Court would soon find
those new limitations in the form of the Oliphant case and the
Wheeler case.
Oliphant involved the August 1973 prosecution of two
defendants accused of assaulting a tribal police officer in the course
of his duties and resisting arrest. 37 The Indian membership status of
the two defendants was that of non-Indians. Additionally, the crime
occurred on he S q ami h T ibe land d ing a ibal celeb a ion
commemorating Chief Seattle. The two defendants argued that the

Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
Id. at 384-85.
37 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
35
36
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Suquamish Indian Provisional Court did not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.38 Before Oliphant, Supreme Court
precedent suggested that although the federal courts or state courts
were allowed to prosecute cases involving non-Indian defendants
for crimes in Indian Country, this jurisdiction was not exclusive.
Thus, jurisdiction could be maintained by state and federal courts
and the tribes simultaneously. Departing from this established
doc ine, he Co
led ha ac i i ie i hin a ibe e i o ha
nq e ionabl impac ed he ibe e e no
i hin he ibe
a ho i o add e . 39 The companion case of United States v.
Wheeler, using the rationale from Oliphant, would soon create a
destructive set of criteria that would be picked up by future cases.
Whee e s contribution to the split-status approach to
resolving American Indian law issues was ironically an attempt to
combine the Indian status of the parties with the Indian status of the
land. The case involved the statutory rape of an Indian minor by a
member of the Navajo Tribe. 40 He was tried and convicted in tribal
court. However, as in the case of Crow Dog, non-Indian forces
became outraged and demanded a stiffer sentence than 15 days in
jail for what amounted to disorderly conduct. 41 Wheeler was then
arrested and indicted for the crime of statutory rape in federal district
court. At the heart of the case was whether Double Jeopardy
protections attached. Wheeler argued that they did. The Court,
however, decided otherwise. The Wheeler Co
held ha he
sovereign power of a tribe to prosecute its members for tribal
offenses clearly does not fall within that part of sovereignty which
he Indian implici l lo b i e of hei dependen a . 42 In
a ruling designed to create importance for the companion case of
Oliphant, he Co
e of implici di e i e ac ed m ch like a
scalpel in the hands of a surgeon. With awkward, artificial
reasoning, the Court found new harmful limitations to the exercise
of tribal sovereignty. The Court held:
The area in which such implicit divestiture of
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those
Id.
Royster, supra note 25, at 63.
40 Wheeler, supra note 23, at 315-16.
41 Id. at 315.
42 Id. at 326.
38
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involving the relations between an Indian tribe and
nonmembers of the tribe. Thus, Indian tribes can no
longer freely alienate to non-Indians the land they
occupy. They cannot enter into direct commercial or
governmental relations with foreign nations. And
they cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts. These
limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status
of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is
necessarily inconsistent with their freedom
independently to determine their external relations.
But the powers of self-government, including the
power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal
laws, are of a different type. They involve only the
relations among members of a tribe. Thus, they are
not such powers as would necessarily be lost by
i e of a ibe dependen a .43
Although the case was decided in favor of the Navajo Tribe and the
Court held that Double Jeopardy did attach, the case undoubtedly
provided the foundation for the most harmful Supreme Court case
in recent memory Montana.
2. Split-Status Approach for Civil Cases--From Montana
to Hicks Montana and Its Remedy
Montana i he cen e piece of he Co
mode n ake on
tribal civil juri dic ion o e nonmembe . 44 The Montana case
involved the regulatory prohibition of hunting and fishing by nonIndian members within the reservation borders of the Crow Tribe of
Montana.45 P e io o he di co e
of ne limi a ion o ibal
o e eign
fo nd in Wheeler and Oliphant, civil jurisdictional
power was held to be within the strict purview of American Indian
Nations. Citing the section of the opinion in Wheeler previously
noted above, the Court held that:
[I]n addition to the power to punish tribal offenders,
the Indian tribes retain their inherent power to
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Judith V. Royster, Montana at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 631, 633647 (2006).
45 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
43
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determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic
relations among members, and to prescribe rules of
inheritance for members. But exercise of tribal power
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of tribes and
so cannot survive without express congressional
delegation.46
The Court then established what would later be known as the
Montana Rule and also attached two exceptions. The Montana Rule
a e ha [ ]ho gh Oliphant only determined inherent tribal
authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied
support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of
he ibe. 47 According to the Court, the two concessions given to
Ame ican Indian Na ion , commonl kno n a he Montana
e cep ion , a e delinea ed a :
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members, through commercial dealing, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements. Tribe may also retain
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. 48
The effect of Montana was the weaponization of the Oliphant and
Wheeler approach to split-status issues. Decided three years after
Oliphant, [ ]he Montana e cep ion held o hope, al ho gh bai
is perhaps more accurate of a term, that tribes would continue to
exercise civil jurisdiction over all persons throughout their
e i o ie
he e ibal in e e
e e a ake. 49 In the end, the
Montana Rule established support of tribal sovereignty only in
situations where Indian status of the parties involved AND the
Id. at 564 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 565.
48 Id. at 566.
49 Royster, supra note 25, at 64.
46
47

17

Indian Country status of the land involved must fall within
American Indian Nations status. 50
Civil jurisdiction post-Montana: the lasting effects of a
confused judiciary. Since Montana[,] the Court has replicated
that justification for using the member/nonmember distinction in a
case involving tribal criminal jurisdiction and has invoked the
distinction as dicta in cases involving tribal civil jurisdiction as
ell. 51 This is exemplified in the cases of Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,52 South Dakota v.
Bourland,53 Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,54 Strate v. A-1
Contractors,55 and Nevada v. Hicks.56 All of the cases represent
concerted efforts to use the split-status approach to whittle away
American Indian Nation sovereignty.
In theory, the Court could have designed M a a scope
and effect to be limited in regard to civil jurisdiction. However, the
effects of Montana have been the Supreme Court slowly bleeding
the tribes of their sovereignty. For example, in Brendale, the Court
held ha he Yakima Na ion po e ed inhe en oning a ho i
over nonmember-owned parcels located in an area of the reservation
closed to the general public and dominated by tribally owned and
member owned parcels, but lacked such authority over nonmemberowned lands in an area in which nearly half the acreage was owned
in fee b nonmembe . 57 The result was a situation where tribal
authorities had failed to satisfy either of the Montana exceptions.58
Onl J ice Ha
Blackm n di en demon a ed a na o l
tailored application of Montana and suggested that the Yakima
Na ion e ained inhe en a ho i o egulate land use by members
and nonmembers alike throughout the Yakima Reservation because
he e e ci e of hi oning a ho i fell i hin Montana econd
exception.59 By doing so, Justice Blackmun appeared to provide a
John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes From the
C he Ha db
C i g-Room Floor, 38 CONN. L. REV. 731, 776 (May
2006).
51 Id. at 743.
52 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408(1989).
53 South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679(1993).
54 Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
55 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
56 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
57 LaVelle, supra note 51, at 744-45.
58 Id. at 745.
59 Id. at 745-46.
50
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workable example of the second Montana exception in practice. In
other words, to Blackmun and the two other Justices that agreed with
him, he Yakima e e ci e of hi oning a ho i
a cen al o
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe within the
meaning of Montana econd e cep ion. 60 I believe that, in the
end, J ice Blackm n di en ep e en ed a en ible pa h f om
Montana a path that was ignored and bypassed for the painful
usage that followed.
The Bourland case out of South Dakota represented the
Co
m ddled applica ion of he Montana general rule. In fact,
the court noted that the Court of Appeals had incorrectly treated the
ibe mine al, g a ing, and imbe igh nde he Che enne Ri e
Act as evidence that the taking ""was not a simple conveyance of
land and all attendant interests in the land," and disagreed with the
lower court's conclusion that "that "Congress has not abrogated the
T ibe p e-e i ing eg la o a ho i . 61 Instead, the Court held
ha Cong e e plici e e a ion of ce ain igh in he aken a ea
doe no ope a e a an implici e e a ion of all fo me igh . 62
Th , Bourland minimal commen a appea ed o po end f he
de e io a ion of inhe en ibal po e
nde he Co
implici
di e i e app oach. 63
The next example of the Court using M a a confusing
approach to civil issues, involved a case called Atkinson Trading Co.
v. Shirley. Here, the issue was the application of a hotel tax on the
Navajo Reservation and whether the Navajo Nation had the
authority to levy the tax. 64 Proving yet again the Montana
exceptions were like outdated road maps leading to dangerous
unknown destinations, the Supreme Court in Atkinson held ha he
Na ajo Na ion ho el occ panc a a applied o nonmembe on
non-Indian fee lands could not be justified under either of
Montana e cep ion . 65 This was because in the eyes of the Court
if i
e e o find Montana fi
e cep ion a i fied b he
p o i ion of ibal e ice he e cep ion o ld allo he le. 66

Id.
Bourland, supra note 54, at 693.
62 Id.
63 LaVelle, supra note 51, at 747.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 750.
66 Id.
60
61
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Likewise, the court held the tax did not fall within
M a a econd e cep ion beca e he co
failed o ee how
pe i ione ope a ion of a ho el on non-Indian fee land threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
ec i , o he heal h o elfa e of he ibe. 67 Atkinson further
bleeds American Indian Nation sovereignty in the area of civil
j i dic ion b ele a ing he h e hold fo applica ion of he econd
Montana exception [by] implying that tribal power must be
nece a
o a e ca a ophic con eq ence . 68 The Co
ea oning appea ed o de i e f om i mi app ehen ion of the use
of the term imperil in Montana and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands of Yakima Indian Nation. 69 In the end, instead of
clarifying Montana, Atkinson e ince a ong end of j dicial
disapproval of the exercise of tribal governing authority over
nonmembers on non-Indian land i hin e e a ion bo nda ie . 70
De pi e an nb oken ing of mode n e a S p eme Co
cases, beginning in 1959 with Williams v. Lee, in which the court
con i en l affi med ibal co
inhe en sovereign authority over
the conduct of all persons including non-Indians, within reservation
bo nda ie , 71 the court struggled to maintain a healthier more
cohesive approach. Instead, as the case of Strate v. A-1 Contractors
demonstrated, the Court diminished the Montana exceptions and
extended Montana gene al le of he p e mp ion again
inherent tribal governing authority over nonmembers to include:
(1) ibal adj dica i e j i dic ion a ell a legi la i e j i dic ion,
and (2) conduct on state highways as well non-Indian fee land . 72
Finally, the case of Nevada v. Hicks represented the natural
extension of the Montana decision. Nevada v. Hicks involved a
ibal membe ca e of ac ion in Fallon Pai e-Shoshone Tribal
court against Nevada game wardens, arguing that the Nevada game
wardens had committed various civil offenses under tribal law and
had al o iola ed Hick fede al ci il igh nde 42 U.S.C. 1983
by illegally searching his on-reservation property for evidence of an
off-reservation crime. In its opinion, the Supreme Court held that
ibal co
lack j i dic ion o e a e official fo ca e of
Id.
Id. at 751.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 752.
71 Id. at 755.
72 Id. at 758.
67
68
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ac ion ela ing o hei pe fo mance of official d ie . 73 The
Co
opinion ep e en ed an np eceden ed applica ion of he
Montana test to an assertion of tribal authority over the conduct of
nonmembers occurring with reservation boundaries on land
belonging o a ibal membe . 74
3. Why Understanding Jurisdiction Issues is So Important
As the reader can now see, the tangle of criminal and civil
jurisdictional issues has understandably left tribe and non-tribe
members alike lost and confused during times and situations when
affected individuals can least afford it. As discussed in the previous
ec ion , he S p eme Co
Montana decision has muddled the
landscape of civil regulatory and enforcement jurisdiction. This is
never more apparent than when discussing the effects of disasters in
Indian Country especially those that are man-made. At the core
of these difficulties is the fact that tribes are left with very few
legislative legal tools by which tribes can criminally punish evildoers and civilly recover damages from negligent actors. It is
important for tribes to be able to act hen di cha ge of ha a do
substances and other pollutants result in injuries to these natural
resources and natural resource services, impairing the important
ecological and economic f nc ion ha he p o ide. 75 In order to
better understand how detrimental these jurisdictional quagmires
can be at times of disaster and emergency, let us now look back to
some examples of past disasters, natural and man-made, that
occurred in Indian Country.
III. A BASIC HISTORY OF FEDERAL APPROACH TO DISASTERS AND
EMERGENCIES IN AMERICA
Before continuing with an analysis of past disasters let us
first understand some key concepts regarding federal disaster relief
and recovery resources. On April 1, 1979, President Jimmy Carter
created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the
Hicks, supra note 57. at 369.
LaVelle, supra note 51. at 759.
75 Allan Kanner, Tribal Sovereignty and Natural Resource Damages, 25 PUB.
LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 93, 93 (2004).
73
74
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na ion
ingle dome ic agenc en
ed o managing he
Na ion di a e . 76 Al ho gh no he fede al go e nmen fi
in ol emen in eme genc managemen , ince i 1979 incep ion
and p o 2010, FEMA had coo dina ed Fede al e pon e and
recovery efforts and supported state, tribal, and local efforts in more
han 1,800 inciden . 77 In 1988, Congress passed the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act78 and then
the Homeland Security Act of 200279 (following the tragedy of the
September 11th attacks in 2001) to act as the legislative foundations
upon which FEMA derives its core mission. That mission was
modified when, following the passage of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, FEMA was consolidated to become an agency within the
Department of Homeland Security and not an independent agency
a i once had been. A a e l , FEMA a a ked o lead he
coordination of efforts across the Federal Government to support its
partners in the Federal, State, Tribal and local government and
p i a e ec o o enhance he Na ion p epa edne
o p e en ,
protect against, respond to recover from, and mitigate all hazards. 80
FEMA accomplishes its mission by providing affected
citizens with assistance in response and recovery from a variety of
events. Using the National Response Framework (NRF) and
National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), FEMA can help
a e , ibe and local go e nmen coo dina e e o ce f om one
another, the Federal Government, voluntary, non-profit and private
ec o agencie ega dle of an e en
i e, cale, o he he i
ecei e a P e iden ial decla a ion. 81 Additionally, FEMA can
coordinate communities with federal support from agencies like the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of
Agriculture (USDA), Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), Department of Health and Human Services

FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, PUBL'N 1, p. 33 (Dep't of Homeland Sec.
(Nov. 2010)), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=691144
[https://perma.cc/6EQL-XVER].
77 Id.
78 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §
5121 (1988) (hereinafter Stafford Act).
79 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
80 FEMA PUBL'N 1, supra note 77, at 20.
81 Erin J. Greten & Ernest B. Abbott, Representing States, Tribes, and Local
Governments Before, During, and After a Presidentially -Declared Disaster, 48
URB. LAW. 489, 492 (2016).
76
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(HHS) , Department of Defense (DOD), and many others. 82 Both
categorizations carry important legal duties and responsibilities
which FEMA is, in turn, expected to provide for affected geographic
populations and government agencies The Stafford Act defines an
eme genc a :
[A]ny occasion or instance for which, in the
determination of the President, Federal assistance is
needed to supplement State and local efforts and
capabilities to save lives and to protect property and
public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the
threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United
States.
Addi ionall , he S affo d Ac , define a majo di a e

a:

[A]ny natural catastrophe (including any hurricane,
tornado, storm, high water, wind driven water, tidal
wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption,
landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or,
regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in
any part of the United States, which in the
determination of the President causes damage of
sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major
disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement
the efforts and available resources of States, local
governments, and disaster relief organizations in
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering
caused thereby.83
A one ill no e, an impo an diffe ence be een an eme genc
and a majo di a e i ha [a] di a e i an e en ha ha
already caused damage to people or property even if additional
damage is continuing. By contrast, the statutory definition of an
eme genc doe no eq i e e i ing damage. 84 This distinction
mean ha [g]o e no and ibal leade ma , b a e no eq i ed

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) (2018).
84 Greten, supra note 82, at 493. (emphasis included)
82
83

23

to, request and receive an emergency declaration before a major
di a e decla a ion. 85
Further differences between the two classifications include
the fact that: (1) The President cannot declare a major disaster
without a formal request from the Governor of the affected state or
in the case of tribal land, a formal request from the affected federal
recognized Indian or Alaska Native Tribe86; (2) the President cannot
declare a major disaster in regards to non-natural events unless the
event involves a fire, flood, or explosion87; and (3) a major disaster
decla a ion a ho i e
he P e iden o app o e mo e a i ance
p og am han eme genc decla a ion . 88
In order to start the disaster declaration process, the Stafford
Ac eq i e ha [o]nl he go e no of a a e o he chief
executive of a federally-recognized Indian tribal government may
request a Presiden ial decla a ion. 89 Within the required
paperwork, the governor or the American Indian Nation chief
e ec i e m
f ni h info ma ion on he na e and amo n of
state/tribe and local resources that have been or will be committed
to alleviating the results of the disaster. 90 Additionally, the request
m incl de he e ima e of he amo n and e e i of damage
i h he p ojec ed impac on he p i a e and p blic ec o , a ell
a an e ima e of he pe and amo n of a i ance needed nde
he S affo d Ac . 91 Finall , he S affo d Ac eq i e ha he [ ]he
request must be based upon a finding that the event is of such
severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the
capabilities of the state/tribe and the affected local governments, and
that federal a i ance i nece a . 92 It is important to note that
until recently, American Indian Nations were required to submit
their formal requests through the governor of the state within which
the tribal boundaries exist. This was changed and codified in the
Stafford Act so that the chief executive of a federally-recognized
tribe could submit a formal request for declaration just as a governor

Id. at 494.
Id. at 495.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 496.
89 Id. at 497, citing 42 U.S.C. §122 (4)-(6), (12) (Supp. 2015).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id., citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5191(a) (Supp. 2013).
85
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of an affected state would. 93 However, non-federally recognized
ibe a e ill cla ified a local go e nmen
and require the
governor of the affected state to actively assist in the application
process.94
Once a formal request has been submitted by the appropriate
leadership representative, FEMA will then evaluate the request
using a number of factors. According to its own regulations, and
codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), the factors
FEMA uses for major disaster declaration evaluation includes, but
is not limited to:
[t]he amount and type of damages; the impact of
damages on affected individuals, the State, and local
governments; the available resources of the State and
local governments and other disaster relief
organizations; the extent and type of insurance in
effect to cover losses; assistance available from other
Federal programs and other sources; imminent
threats to public health and safety; recent disaster
history in the State; hazard mitigation measures
taken by the State or local governments, especially
implementation of measures required as a result of
previous major disaster declarations; and other
factors pertinent to a given incident. 95
Once FEMA evaluates the request, the agency will then provide a
written recommendation and analysis which is then delivered to the
President for authorization as a formal declaration or rejection.
Upon fo mal P e iden ial decla a ion of an affec ed a ea
a
fo majo di a e , FEMA and he a e o ibe o k
together to navigate the daunting task of recovery amid the difficult
terrain to federal agency bureaucracy. In a Federal Aid process
already fraught with complexities and obstacles, major disasters
involving Tribal Nations are even more so. Some of these
complications can best be understood by reviewing past events
affecting tribal communities in Indian Country.

42 U.S.C. § 5170.
Greten, supra 82, at 503.
95 44 C.F.R. §206.37(c)(1).
93
94
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IV. EXAMPLES OF PAST DISASTERS IN INDIAN
COUNTRY
A. Examples of Past Natural Disasters in Indian Country
Mudslide in Oso, Washington
During one of our opening scenarios, we challenged ourselves
to imagine a quiet spring day in March and the mudslide that soon
followed. Regretfully, this academic exercise represented the harsh
reality encountered by the members of the Sauk-Suiattle Indian
Tribe (SSIT) of Washington State. On the morning of March 22,
2014, deep within the North Cascade Mountains of Washington
S a e, a de a a ing m d lide eng lfed 49 home , a e pon ible
fo he dea h of 43 people and de o ed ili inf a c e
Without phone or Internet service, tribal government operation
largely came to a standstill and made the process of initiating
eme genc e ice nea l impo ible. 96 To compound these
initial difficulties, the SSIT leadership was further hampered by the
fact that the loss of State Route 530 forced tribe members to
comm e 92 mile each a o he o n of A ling on using an
al e na e o e in o de o acce emplo men obliga ion and
medical services.97 In addition to loss of life and property, the
m d lide effec on ibe membe da -to-day transportation
expenses proved to be disruptive. For example, tribe members who
had already been living well below the poverty line were forced to
pa ga oline p ice a nea l $4.00 pe gallon. 98
Shortly after the mudslide devastated their community,
leaders of the SSIT testified before the Senate Committee of Indian
Affairs and reported on their difficult experiences with FEMA and
the deferral disaster responses process. At the hearings, the SSIT
leaders recommended that FEMA must: (1) clarify its requirements
for tribal emergency declarations, (2) improve its coordination with
Tribes and Charitable Organizations like the Red Cross, and (3)
assist the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and Indian Health Services
(IHS) in enacting disaster response protocols and make emergency
When Catastrophe Strikes: Responses to Natural Disaster in Indian Country:
Hearing before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014) (Statement of
Hon. Ronda Metcalf, Secretary, Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe).
97 Id.
98 Id.
96
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resources available when needed. 99
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Winter snowstorms in California. In April 2016, the Los Coyotes
Band of Cahuilla and Cupeño Indians experienced a snowstorm. The
storm caused over $173,000 in damage and resulted in significant
loss to the small tribes. Tribal leadership filed for public assistance
and ha a d mi iga ion b
e e denied b FEMA. The T ibe
eq e fo a majo di a e decla a ion a denied ba ed on he
determination that the damage was not of such severity and
magnitude as to warrant supplemental federal assistance under the
S affo d Ac . 101 For a small tribe of 328 enrolled members a storm
of the scale it faced during that April 2016 storm, the reported
damages of over $173,252.00 were huge and exemplified the
diffic l ie
ome ibe enco n e h o gh FEMA
di a e
evaluation process.102
Wildfires, drought, landslides, and flooding affecting the
Santa Clara Pueblo of New Mexico. A third and equally

Id.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-433, EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MAJOR DISASTER DECLARATION
PROCESS FOR FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED TRIBES (2018), pg. 17 (Although the
pic e a aken d ing he Confede a ed T ibe of Col ille Re e a ion 2013
flooding event, it vividly demonstrates the bureaucratic quagmire and obstacles
tribes have encountered when seeking post-disaster relief from the United States
federal government that SSIT leadership discussed in their Senate testimony.)
101 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, PRELIMINARY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
REPORT LOS COYOTES BAND OF CAHUILLA-CUPEÑO INDIANS SEVERE WINTER
STORM AND FLOODING DENIAL (2016), pg. 2.
102 See general information about the Los Coyotes tribe at
http://www.kumeyaay.info/los_coyotes.html [https://perma.cc/M99H-7TLW].
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informative example is that of the difficulties faced by the Santa
Clara Pueblo. When Santa Clara Pueblo Governor J. Michael
Chavarria testified before the United States Senate in 2017, he
submitted through a prepared statement that his north-central New
Me ican ibe had lo o e 16,000 ac e of o fo e land and
hen combined i h he land lo in he O o Comple Fi e of
1998 and the Cerro Grande Fire of 2000 has resulted in the
destruction of 80% of our forests and a huge part of our cultural
he i age. 103 He al o e ified ha [n]one of he fo fi e e ha e
faced in the past decade have originated on our lands, yet we have
suffered the repeated and severe consequences of these natural
di a e . The Go e no al o info med he legi la i e bod ha the
suffering he referred to took the form of physical damage to the land
in the form of a 25.9 mile burn scar.104 A burn scar refers to land
that has been charred and stripped of all vegetation by a wildfire.
Because the land is devoid of vegetation, no root systems remain in
place to secure the land. As a result, the land is vulnerable to flash
floods and mudslides. Our Pueblo has experienced severe flash
flooding since the fire.105
Governor Chavarria concluded his prepared statement by
making the following five recommendations: (1) the creation of a
BIA Eme genc Re pon e F nd o ha he BIA co ld ha e eadil
available significant funding that can be deployed as necessary to
address short- and long-term disaster recovery and disaster
mi iga ion need ; (2) he e of he FEMA T ibal G idance
Doc men o help eflec he di e e oice of ibal leade and
emergency management officials, among others, and is responsive
o hei conce n , ; (3) he con in ed e of he S affo d Ac h o gh
the use of maintenance of amendments; (4) the appropriation of
necessary funds for implementation of Forest treatment as identified
under the Tribal Forest Protection Act (TFPA), and (5) additional
funding for fire prevention treatments on and off tribal
reservations.106

E e ge c Ma age e i I dia C
:I
i g FEMA Fede a Tribal Relationship with Indian Tribes: Hearing before the Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017) (Statement of Hon. J. Michael Chavarria, Governor,
Pueblo of Santa Clara).
104 Id. at 16.
105 Id. at 19.
106 Id. at 24.
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B. Examples of Past Man-Made Disasters in Indian Country
We have explored together some the natural disasters that
have plagued Indian Country over recent years. In addition to the
natural disasters discussed above, tribes have also encountered
devastating man-made disasters. As previously discussed, manmade e en a e echnicall ca ego i ed nde eme genc
a ,
although as the example below will demonstrate, these events are no
less devastating to those tribes affected by them.
Gold King Mine Disaster. On August 5, 2015, an
Environmental Protection Agency contractor attempted to contain a
leak from the Gold King Mine. Instead, the contractor ruptured the
mine
con aining ba ie , elea ing million of gallon of
contaminated water into Cement Creek.107 The con ac o
ing
hea machine
p ed he mine con ainmen ba ie elea ing
millions of gallons of contaminated mine waste into a tributary of
the Animas River, Cement Creek. This toxic wastewater containing
heavy metals such as arsenic, lead, and cadmium flowed from
Cement Creek into the Animas River, and into the San Juan River
(hereinafte SJR ). 108 Delegate Lorenzo Ba e no ed ha he
Navajo Communities along the river have experienced significant
cultural and economic damages as a result of the spill. Water is
sacred to the Navajo People; it is the basis of all life. Spiritually and
culturally Navajo beliefs are deeply connected to the land, air, and
water that lie between the four sacred mountains that form the
abo iginal bo nda of o land. 109 Most importantly, Delegate
Ba e empha i ed ha [ ]he pill ha con amina ed o de o ed
many of the essential elements of our religious practice, and
desecrated a river we have treated with reverence since time
immemo ial. 110
Difficulties with the Federal response to the emergency were
poignantly demonstrated by the 2015 Senate testimony of Navajo
Nation President Russell Begaye. He testified that:
EPA G d Ki g Mi e Di a e : E a i i g he Ha f I ac
I dia
Country: Hearing before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015)
(Statement of LoRenzo Bates, Navajo Nation Council Delegate for
Communities of Nenahnezad, Newcomb, San Juan, Tiis Tsoh Sikaad,
T e Daa Kaan, and Uppe F i land).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
107
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Simply, we do not trust the EPA. Why?
They did not inform the Nation of the accident until
two days after the blowout. I believe the only reason
they finally informed the Navajo Nation is because
you cannot hide an accident when the rivers turn
orange.
When we first received notice, they told us it
was 1 million gallons of contaminants that was
released from the mine but later, they changed it to 3
million gallons. Since then, it has neared 30 million
gallons.
At a public hearing, the USEPA
representative said the water was churning up at the
base of the mountain but when the vice president and
I went to the mouth of the mine to visually
investigate, we were stunned to see the yellow river.
I even showed the USEPA officials a picture
I had just taken a few hours before of the toxic waters
that were still pouring out of the mine and it was
yellow.
The last straw was when USEPA gave my
people 20 million gallon water tanks for relief.
Those tanks were tainted with oil. I directly asked
the USEPA about the tainted tanks.
They
vehemently denied that they had oily substances in
them.
They said, it is only used for clean drinking
water but when I personally wen to one tank, put my
hand into the intake valve of that tank, my hand came
out blackened with oil. They expected us to give that
tainted water to our livestock and crops.
Let me again say, the Navajo Nation does not
trust the USEPA. We expect them to be held fully
accountable for what they have done to my people
and to all people who live along both the San Juan
and Animas Rivers.
I am not just speaking today for my people
but all peoples whose souls hurting from what should
have been an avoidable, negligent act. Today is our
greatest time of need with our people struggling for
water for their animals, livestock and irrigation. The
USEPA has abandoned us.
The water tanks are being pulled out, feed for
our livestock has stopped. Last Friday, Ms.
McCarthy and I spoke on the phone and she was
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unaware that the USEPA had stopped giving water.
I did not know that we stopped giving hay.
As EPA Administrator, how does she not
know that this was happening? The orders to leave
our Nation case from her regional directors. This just
adds to the culture of distrust they have created.
What my people need first and foremost is
compensation and need it now. The farmers have
spent monies they do not have and are expected to
purchase materials, haul water and buy hay for their
livestock.
Our farmers and ranchers still need hay and
water. EPA has pulled out. BIA has expended all of
their funds. We are now taking monies from our
emergency account to help our people.
I am saying that today I want this Committee
to stand with us and make sure the EPA pays for what
it has done to my people, to my Nation. 111
P e iden Bega e e imon a f ll and po e f ll demon a e
the sense of powerlessness, abandonment, and betrayal felt by the
Navajo Nation that he leads. Moreover, his testimony vividly
highlights the flaws inherent in the disaster response process
involving American Indian Nations and Tribes. In particular,
President Begaye implored Senate committee members to recognize
that tribes face many legal hurdles when dealing with man-made
disasters. This is especially true due to the fact that the tribes lack
the criminal jurisdictional tools (as per Wheeler). Tribes and also
lack the civil jurisdictional tools (as per Montana) to punish
contractors like those involved in the Gold King Mine disaster.
To complicate matters further, the negligence of federal
government contractors and corporations force tribes to do what
they can to recover damages. In fact, American Indian Nations are
of en fo ced o eek onl ci il emedie fo inj
o, de c ion
of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of
a e ing ch inj
a pe fede al a e like he Comp ehen i e
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERLA). 112 Theoretically, statutes like CERLA are designed to

Id. at 30-31 (Statement of the Hon. Russell Begaye, President of the Navajo
Nation) (Emphasis added).
112 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(6), 9607(a)(4), (c).
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ecogni e he a ho i of Indian ibe o commence actions for
na al e o ce damage . 113
However, in practice how likely is it that American Indian
Nations and Tribes like Navajo Nation will be able to recover
something from a negligent federal contractor, the EPA, the federal
government itself, or even private corporations acting negligently in
Indian County for the damages inflicted upon their natural resources
by the Gold King Mine disaster? Regretfully, if the experiences of
the Alaskan Native Villages following the Exxon Valdez oil tankard
disaster in 1989 are any indication, the Navajo Tribes will recover
very little and only after decades of litigation. 114
When the Exxon Valdez oil tankard ran aground along the
Bligh Reef of in e io Ala ka, [e]le en million gallon of oil pilled
into the pristine waters of Prince William Sound, and the oil slick
itself spread over 1000 square miles. Oil soaked or spattered 1200
miles of coastline, a distance equal to a length of land running from
Cape Cod to the Outer Banks of North Carolina. Hundreds of miles
of beaches on federal, state, and municipal land were also covered
i h oil. 115 Attempting to use the authority under CERCLA and
the Clean Water Act, the Alaska Native communities sought
mone a emedie fo c l al damage , in he fo m of
bsistence
damage , ha he
ffe ed. While
b i ence i adi ionall
ecogni ed in ca e la a impl meaning a da -to-day utilization
of game and other resources to provide for nourishment and other
basic needs. However, in the context of native cultures, the term has
a broader and deeper meaning, so that to Alaska Natives, loss of
natural resources means something more than a simple inability to
ain he bod fo lack of food. 116 As Mary Kanciewick and Eric
Smi h no ed in hei a icle, S b istence in Alaska: Towards a
Na i e P io i , b i ence ha mo e o do i h men al heal h and
spiritual well-being han i doe i h economic ec i . 117 Even
more tragic was the fact that state and federal statutes were not

Kanner, supra note 74, at 106.
Deborah S. Bardwick, The A e ica T S e
Re
e
Environmental Disaster: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill as a Case Study, 19 STAN.
ENVTL. L. J. 259 (2000).
115 Id. at 261 (internal citations omitted).
116 Id. at 280 (internal citations omitted).
117 Mary Kanciewick & Eric Smith, Subsistence in Alaska: Towards a Native
Priority, 59 UMKC L. REV. 645, 649 (1991) as cited in Bardwick, supra note
118, at 280.
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designed to recognize damage fo he
b i ence c l e of
Na i e g o p . 118 The e l a ha Ala ka Na i e co ld no
recover for cultural damages to their subsistence way of life. Judge
Holland deci ion in he In re The Exxon Valdez and the Ninth
Ci c i
b eq en affi ma ion of he di ic co
deci ion
confi med ha eading of he la . 119
Regretfully, little has legally changed during the time
between the Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster and the Gold King Mine
disaster. Although the Congressional passage of the Oil Pollution
Ac of 1990 a e ha companie ho e ope a ion ma lead o
natural resource liability now face a new political willingness and
onge la and eg la ion o p o ec e he e claim , he cope
of the new laws are limited and do not address the cultural damages
suffered by tribes following man-made events like these.120
After looking at the past natural and man-made disasters, we
are left with a variety of pressing questions: What do the future of
disaster and emergency issues in Indian Country look like? What
are some possible solutions?
V. FUTURE DISASTERS IN INDIAN COUNTRY
In addition to natural disasters, it is impossible to ignore the
likelihood that many different forms of disaster events will pepper
our future. In particular, there may exist natural disaster events
whose origins are man-made such as: (1) disastrous weather
resulting from climate change, and (2) terrorist acts. Some of these
risks can be seen even now.
A. Some Examples of Future Challenges Facing Tribes
1.

Climate Change

A current example of the visible effects of climate change is
exemplified by the plight of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe of
Louisiana.121 Living on Isle de Jean Charles, the tribe members have
Bardwick, supra note 117, at 286.
Id.
120 Kanner, supra note 76, at 94.
121 Madaline King, A Tribe Faces Rising Tides: The Resettlement of Isle de Jean
Charles, 6 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RES. 295 , Mar. 23, 2018, available at
118
119

33

seen their 22,400-ac e a ea d op o a me e 320 ac e oda 122 due
to flooding and coastal water rising. Communities like those of the
Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw (BCC) tribe can be found in coastal
communities lining the shores of the Pacific Northwest in Alaska.
The legal and statutory tools available to tribal leaders and federal
agencies appear limited as the waters continue to rise and the
number of available options disappear. For example, can the tribe
members be forced to leave? Should they be forced to leave?
In her law review article, recent Louisiana State University
Law School graduate, Madaline King offers the timely argument
that even restrained discussion of moving the tribe members can
only occur after stakeholders can agree on some basic language and
concep . The diffe ence be een eloca ion and e e lemen
clarify why one concept is preferred over the other. . .. Relocation is
essentially the ad hoc migration of people. Resettlement is the
permanent or long-term movement of a community from one site to
ano he . 123 King gge
ha eloca ion de o an emblance
of community the residents once had. Such movement is connected
to a loss of identity. Although residents lose their homes, an even
bigger price is paid: the loss of social, cultural, and religious aspects
of he comm ni . 124 In con a , [d] ing e e lemen , he
essential characteristics of the original community, such as its social
structures, legal and political systems, culture, and worldviews, are
p e e ed The comm ni main ain i
ni in a fo m ha i
imila o he o iginal comm ni . 125
Finally, an important consideration regarding the issue of
relocation and resettlement of an American Indian Nation even
when involving a climate-related disaster, is that historical and
cultural contexts are of the utmost importance. In other words,
asking a tribe like the BCC to relocate can reignite the historical
en ion a ocia ed i h pa
eloca ion ha e e ied o fede al
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1128&context=j
elrhttps://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1128&contex
t=jelr [https://perma.cc/S9WJ-AFPA].
122 Id. at 306, citing Carolyn Van Houten, The First Official Climate Refugees in
the U.S. Race Against Time, NAT L GEOGRAPHIC, (May 25, 2016), available at
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2016/05/160525-isle-de-jeancharles-louisiana-sinking-climate-change-refugees/ [https://perma.cc/36VLRD62].
123 Id. at 301 (internal citations omitted).
124 Id. (internal citations omitted).
125 Id. at 302 (internal citations omitted).
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policies designed to destroy and eradicate the social structures and
sovereignty of tribes throughout the nation. Thus, King argues that
tribal leadership and federal agencies should prioritize the option of
resettlement instead of relocation. With this as a possibility the
comm ni can pla a majo ole in deci ion-making regarding
where the resettlement site will be located, what resources the new
community will have access to, when the first phases will begin, and
ho he plan ill nfold. 126 The resettlement plan can also be used
o p o ec ha i lef of Lo i iana coa line and o c ea e a model
for other communities that will face similar problem . 127
2. The Threat of Terrorism in Indian Country
In addition to an increased number of natural disasters,
whether or not from climate-change, those in Indian Country must
recognize the dangerous reality of terrorism. Regretfully, current
federal statutes provide the American Indian Nations and Tribes
with little in the way of regulatory powers to combat terrorism.
Even worse is the fact that the failed jurisdictional approach results
in the increased danger to individual tribe members
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 federal
legislation was passed to provide federal government agencies with
he mean o g a an ee he p o ec ion of bo de pa ol and c i ical
inf a c e in hope of p o ec ing he li e of Uni ed States
ci i en . 128 The main legislative vehicle for providing this
protection came in the form of the passage of the Homeland Security
Act129 and the United and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
(USA PATRIOT Act).130 Each statute was designed so that by
making i mo e diffic l o ge a pa po in o he co n and pa
through airport security, the country is under the impression that it
i afe and ha he e i no hing lef o fea . 131 However, there
Id. at 314.
Id. at 313.
128 Jennifer Butts, Victims in Waiting: How the Homeland Security Act Falls
Short of Fully Protecting Tribal Lands, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 373, 374,
(2004).
129 Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
130 United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
131 Butts, supra note 130, at 374.
126
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remain significant flaws in the protection of critical infrastructure,
especially infrastructure located in Indian Country. For example,
he G and Co lee Dam on he Col ille e e a ion, hich i he
largest producer of hydroelectric power in the United States, and the
third-largest in the world. Also present are nuclear power facilities,
power grids, military supply manufacturers, and transportation
o e . 132
The precarious nature of Homeland Security in Indian
Country often results in jurisdictional chaos, especially when it
comes to criminal jurisdiction. For example, the Navajo Nation
struggled to punish the contractor involved in the Gold King Mine
disaster for the same reason jurisdictional chaos, especially in the
form of criminal jurisdiction. As previously discussed in Part I of
this paper, the Supreme Court ruling in Oliphant established that
ibal co
do no ha e c iminal j i dic ion o e non-Indians
because Congress had not affirmatively granted that power by treaty
o a e. 133 The Co
ea oned ha Cong e m
p o ec i
citizens from infringement on their personal liberties. To allow
United States citizens (non-Indians) to be subject to another judicial
system would violate congressional responsibility over United
S a e ci i en . 134 The limitations created by the Oliphant opinion
regarding tribal court criminal jurisdiction were compounded by
certain aspects of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. With the
statutory creation of the Department of Homeland Security, tribal
sovereignty was further intruded upon in a variety of ways.
This first example is how the Homeland Security Act
statutorily defines terrorism and to whom the acts of terrorism apply.
It defines terrorism as:
[A]ny activity that (A) involves an act that (i) is
dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of
critical infrastructure or key resources, and (ii) is a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or
any state or other subdivision of the United States;
and (B) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
Id. at 375.
Id. at 378, citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203-04
(1978).
134 Id.
132
133
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or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. 135
In addition to statutorily defining terrorism, the Homeland Security
Act clarifies the protections and safeguards it provides. As per the
Homeland Security Act, the local government is defined as:
(A) a county, municipality, city, town,
township, local public authority, school district,
special district, intrastate district, council of
governments (regardless of whether the council of
governments is incorporated as a nonprofit
corporation under State law), regional or interstate
government entity, or agency or instrumentality of a
local government;
(B) an Indian tribe or authorized tribal
organization, or in Alaska a Native village or Alaska
Regional Native Corporation; and
(C) a rural community, unincorporated town
or village, or other public entity. 136
The Homeland Sec i Ac emb ace he no ion of fede ali m b
empo e ing he local go e nmen 137 beca e i
e pec and
acknowledges the importance of local law enforcement, emergency
e pon e p o ide , and ocial e ice agencie . 138 However, at the
same time, the treatment and definition of American Indian Nations
and T ibe a local go e nmen
eemingl igno e he doc ine
of tribal sovereignty and domestic dependent status established in
he Ma hall ilog . 139
The second example of how the Homeland Security Act
intrudes upon tribal sovereignty is demonstrated by the lack of a
working relationship between the federal government.140 Often, as
he e pe ience of he Chippe a C ee T ibe highligh , [a] look a
the amount of money already allotted to tribes for homeland security
indicates
the
nonexistent
government-to-government
Id. at 381, citing Homeland Security Act § 2(15), Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2135 (2002) (emphasis added).
136 Id.
137 Butts, supra note 130, at 381.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 387.
140 Id.
135
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ela ion hip. 141 To illustrate this point, of the $9,000,000 the State
of North Dakota received from the Department of Homeland
Security, [o]nly $75,000 was earmarked for all Indian tribes in the
state.142 Wi h facili ie
ch a he Min eman la nch i e and
Garrison dam present in the state, this does not seem to be enough
to effectively prevent and respond to a terrorist attack. And to make
matters worse, the state of North Dakota never consulted tribes
when determining the homeland security needs within Indian
Co n . 143
Other potential avenues of terrorism. Other means by
which terrorists can target people are through 1) agroterrorism and
2) bioterrorism. Both are potential disasters and emergencies that
citizens and their leadership must acknowledge is possible, even in
Indian Country. Again, with each as in that of infrastructure targeted
terrorism, issues of jurisdiction and sovereignty abound.
As early as December 2004, outgoing Secretary of Health
and H man Se ice , e p e ed hi conce n ha he na ion food
supply would be considered a particularly inviting target. In fact,
d ing hi fa e ell add e , Sec e a Tomm Thomp on a ed, I,
for the life of me, cannot understand why the terrorists have not . . .
attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do. And we are
importing a lot of food from the Middle East, and it would be easy
o ampe
i h ha . 144 Ag o e o i m i
he delibe a e
introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating
fear over the safety of food, causing economic losses, and/or
nde mining ocial abili . 145
Agroterrorism can be initiated in one of two ways. As a
result, it is particularly difficult to combat. The two methods of
attack come in the form of 1) deliberately infecting the food item
Id. at 388.
Id.
143 Id. citing Alvin Windy Boy, Chairman, Chippewa Cree Business Committee
in Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002:
Hearing on S. 578 Before the Senate Comm. On Indian Affairs, 108th Cong.
(2003), available at
http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/073003pmhrg/Inouye.PDF
[https://perma.cc/H7JK-TFVJ].
144 Erick Rhoam, What Congress Gives, Congress Takes Away: Tribal Sovereign
Immunity and the Threat of Agroterrorism, 19 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 137
(2009), citing William Branigin, et.al., Tommy Thompson Resigns From HHS,
WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2004.
145 Id. at 140, citing Jim Monke, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 1 (2007).
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before importing it into the United States, or 2) an individual or
terrorist cell can enter the United States and deliberately infect the
food supply chain from within the country. 146 Whether by
deliberately infecting a food item from abroad or at home, terrorists
could successfully wreak havoc upon the national psyche and sense
of security. American Indian Nations and Tribes are essential links
in he na ional food ppl chain beca e ag ic l e i Indian
Co n
econd-la ge emplo e 147 a [ ]e e al ibe o n
fa m and p od ce food ha en e he na ion food ppl . 148 To
demon a e hi in e ac ion, [a] 2003 Food Safe B iefing, gi en
by the Indian Health Service noted there are 4,068 tribal food service
e abli hmen ope a ed b 334 ibe . 149
Additionally, many tribes are located on the border of either
Me ico o Canada. The e l ing p oblem in ol e j i dic ional
i e , and la enfo cemen a ho i o handle a p oblem on
Indian land can change acco ding o he ci il/c iminal na e of he
offense, the seriousness of the offense, the tribal status of those
in ol ed, and he a e in hich he offen e i commi ed. 150 The
e l i ha [ ]he e en anglemen make illegal mig a ion in o he
United States easier because Indian tribes do not coordinate well, if
at all, with border patrol. Compounding the problem is the
friendliness shown by Indian tribes to illegal immigrants because
they are more gracious than the Border Patrol agents. An
agroterrorism attack originating from Indian land, via a successful
border penetration, is a serious conce n. 151
Once an act of agroterrorism or bioterrorism begins to
involve tribe members, what tools and resources are available for
T ibe o e o add e he g o ing eme genc ? A hif ing and
complex body of law controls jurisdiction on Indian lands. This
leaves many open questions regarding the scope of tribal and state
a ho i o eg la e and e pond o h ea o p blic heal h. 152

Id. at 142.
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148 Id.
149 Id. at 144, citing INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE, TRIBAL FOOD SAFETY ISSUES BY
THE NUMBERS (2003).
150 Id. at 144 (internal citations omitted).
151 Id. at 144-45.
152 Justin B. Barnard, Responding to Public Health Emergencies on Tribal
Lands: Jurisdictional Challenges and Practical Solutions, 15 YALE J. HEALTH
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Traditional methods of addressing the emergency often involve
q a an ine and i ola ion o o he me hod of ocial di ancing. 153
Other tools available to the state or local health officials and
agencies include: (1) identifying and treating infected individuals; 154
(2) secure and separate personal and real property like livestock and
domestic animals;155 and (3) utilize investigative powers that may
incl de he po e o en e and in pec p i a e p ope , and ma
include other administrative investigation powers such as the ability
o bpoena indi id al and doc men . 156 However, should a
terrorist attack befall a tribe, whether bioterrorism or agroterrorism
in nature, it would be challenging to initiate the traditional
techniques of addressing the emergency.
In other words, relying upon the traditional techniques of
add e ing an eme genc i p oblema ic beca e [t]he coercive
nature of these measures, coupled with the jurisdictional
uncertainty. . . underscores the need for tribal and state governments
to work together. It is important to ensure that the government entity
implementing a particular response to a public health threat does so
with a mantle of legitimacy and the support of its neighboring
o e eign. 157 In the end, when dealing with public health
eme gencie in Indian Co n , no ma e he ca e, [f]ede al and
state laws generate, rather than answer, questions as to who has
jurisdiction to pursue emergency response measures in areas that are
likel o be of conce n o a e p blic heal h official . 158 In his
a icle, Re ponding o P blic Heal h Eme gencie on T ibal Land :
Jurisdictional Challenges and P ac ical Sol ion , a ho J in B.
Barnard, Esq., put it best when he noted that:
Given the coercive nature of many public health
emergency measures which may require holding
individuals against their will, entering or destroying
property, or closing down public spaces and
businesses the
perceived
legitimacy
and
acceptance of the implemen ing go e nmen
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1239&context
=yjhple [https://perma.cc/5XUZ-7DB3].
153 Id. at 257.
154 Id. at 258.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 259 citing Minn. Stat. § 144.054 (2015).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 280.
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authority seems especially critical to the success of
the response. Indeed, disputes over tribal sovereignty
have ended in armed stand-offs between tribal
members and the local, state, and federal government
officials.159
B. The Importance of Tribes Being Prepared and Active in Trying
to Influence Federal Policy Formation
What can American Indian Nations and Tribes do when
confronted with the jurisdictional hurdles and intrusions that occur
during and after a disaster or emergency, no matter what the cause
may be? There are three possible solutions to address some of the
global j i dic ional conce n ha ill omeda affec mo ibe
during a disaster or emergency.
First, it is vital that Tribes do what they can to develop
in e go e nmen al ag eemen
(IGA)
i h neighbo ing
governmental entities in the form of state, county, and municipal
agencie and o gani a ion .
An IGA i an ag eemen o
memorandum of understanding (MOU) negotiated between a tribe
and a neighboring government to clarify some aspect of their legal
relationship. In some case, these agreements permit cooperation and
ha ing of e o ce . 160 The e l of an ag eemen , in i ed
before an active emergency, would establish and specify roles,
responsibilities, and authorities to which the involved governments
co ld ag ee. 161 In establishing and specifying roles,
responsibilities, and authorities, the parties of the agreement also
cla if he applica ion of b oad and nce ain j i dic ional
principles in very specific contexts likely to arise in a public health
eme genc . 162 Mo impo an l , j
he p oce of nego ia ion
may foster a cooperative relationship between tribal and state or
local governments that the involved governments can codify in an
IGA o pledge of m al a i ance. 163
Next, it is equally important for legal professionals who are
entrusted with assisting the American Indian Nations during this
preparation process to make themselves and their Tribal clients
Id.
Id. at 279.
161 Id. at 281.
162 Id.
163 Id.
159
160
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aware of the applicable statutory processes during and after a
disaster or emergency occurs in Indian Country. For instance, in the
case of FEMA disaster recovery and assistance, tribes can take
proactive steps that will pay in time, money, and expenditure of
resources during a disaster. One such step includes communities
p e-q alif ing deb i emo al con ac o , o con ac o fo
other emergency work that is commonly required, before an event
and solicit bid prices from this list of contractors once an event has
occurred. This method allows competitive bidding while preserving
the ability to achieve reasonable market prices at the time the work
i pe fo med. 164 In other words, by planning ahead, the tribe is
more likely to develop a more viable and economical budget plan
rather than risk higher costs that might result from limited postdi a e e o ce and he en ing i k fo p ice-go ging f om
vendors and contractors. Another pre-disaster preparation tool,
ibe can ili e a e he e abli hmen of m al aid ag eemen
before disaster strikes, and to address the subject of reimbursement
in hei
i en m al aid ag eemen . 165 Another example of how
a o ne can help hei ibal clien i ha b
o k[ing] i h hei
clients to formally adopt, a local code or ordinance that giver local
government officials the responsibility to enter private property to
remove disaster-related debris or perform work in the presence of
an immedia e h ea . 166 Addi ionall , he [a] o ne ho ld en e
that their clients comply with requirements and permits for debris
operations. For example, staging and disposal sites should be a safe
distance from property boundaries, wetlands, surface water,
structures, wells, septic fields, and endangered species, and
appropriate sites should be identified for the disposal of hazardous
ma e ial . 167 While not an exhaustive list of pre-disaster legal
tasks, this list shows a glimpse of some of the expectations that
federal agencies like FEMA will expect of those within Indian
Country during and following a disaster or emergency declaration.
The third proposed solution for American Indian Nations
and Tribes to consider is to maintain constant communication and
involvement in the continued formation of federal disaster relief and
recovery policy with the knowledge that by doing so, the voices of
Greten, supra note 82, at 521.
Id.
166 Id. at 529.
167 Id.
164
165
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tribal citizens cannot be ignored. In particular, it would benefit all
tribes to unite and force federal agencies and officials to understand
that:
Tribes have not been invited to testify at other
congressional committees regarding disasters and
emergency preparedness and when FEMA testifies
before other committees we do not hear tribal issues
being highlighted or even mentioned. We hope
members of the Committee will assist in ensuring
that tribes will be included in all hearings regarding
this important topic.
We urge the Committee to request the
Congressional Research Service to report on the
possible legislative actions related to tribal
emergency management that Congress should
consider. Specifically, the CRS should evaluate the
Stafford Act and the Sandy Recovery and
Improvement Act and recommend changes for tribal
participation and consider whether separate tribal
disaster laws are needed. 168
This request for active participation in policy formation is important
to follow-up because it is evident that many of the solutions to the
jurisdictional issues facing Indian Nation go through Washington
D.C. and either Congress or the Supreme Court. A continued
disconnect and/or hostility between American Indian Nations and
the federal government will continue to result in the further
marginalization of American Indian Nations and their citizens at
times of disaster, man-made or natural. This counter-productive
relegation of sovereignty risks coming at times when tribes and their
members could least afford. In the end, it is up to Indian Country to
demand a voice in legislative vehicles to forward tribal sovereignty
or to fight in the Supreme Court for judicial interpretations
consistent with the doctrine of self-determination and full tribal
sovereignty.

Prepared Statement of Hon. Brian Cladoosby, President, National Congress
of American Indians, When Catastrophe Strikes: Responses to Natural Disaster
in Indian Country: Hearing before the Committee on Indian Affairs, United
States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, p. 63 Jul. 30,
2014, available at https://www.indian.senate.gov/hearing/oversight-hearingwhen-catastrophe-strikes-responses-natural-disasters-indian-country
[https://perma.cc/Q7VN-YKG9].
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VI. CONCLUSION
Jurisdictional issues and complications hang over each tribe
adding weight and force to already life-changing events, no matter
he i a ion. The b ea c a ic no-man land
hich of en ap
tribe members and the tribal leadership that serve them make
natural or man-made
disasters and emergencies extremely
difficult for tribal authorities to address. Difficulties range from the
intricacies of federal Indian law, lack of coordination between
federal, state and tribal agencies, and lack of shared vision for
preparedness and prevention. Whether we imagine ourselves: as a
person suffering from the effects of a Washington State mudslide, a
Southern Californian surviving a severe winter storm, a tribe
member in the wildfire-scarred mountains of North-Central New
Mexico, a grandfather on the banks of his ancestral lands on the
shore of the San Juan River, a Louisiana tribe member suffering the
effects of climate-change-induced shoreline flooding and erosion, or
a cattle rancher whose livestock is effected by agroterrorism and/or
bioterrorism, we must recognize that only through the cooperation
of the federal, state, and tribal governments can each tribe and tribe
member navigate the complexities facing them in times of disaster.
In the end, we must all prepare and take the necessary steps to avoid
the ill-fated future that Chief Flying Hawk warned those willing to
listen when he said: nobod can be in good heal h if he doe no
ha e all he ime f e h ai , n hine, and good a e . 169
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Chief Flying Hawk, supra at note 2.
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